Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 13
Issue 3 Issue 3 - June 1960

Article 9

6-1960

Libel Per Se and Special Damages
Alfred H. Knight III

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Alfred H. Knight III, Libel Per Se and Special Damages, 13 Vanderbilt Law Review 730 (1960)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/9

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information,
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 13

08
functhe haphazard dividing lines between legislative and judicial
tions appears commendable. If discrimination and prejudice are vices
for the board wearing its judicial gowns, they are no less so because
it momentarily adopts the garb of the legislator.
Any comprehensive change in the rules on bias must depend, of
course, Qn the legislature, whose creatures the modern-day agencies
are. But if the legislature does not choose to act, it would seem to be
the duty of the courts to assert more vigorously their concern for the
rights of the individual against biased government agencies. As Mr.
Justice Douglas stated recently, speaking of the due process clause:
"These safeguards and guaranties are designed to protect the citizen
not only against mobs, but against government itself. Procedural due
process gives protection against overreaching officials."' 1 9 It is precisely such protection that is needed to combat potential partiality
within the modern administrative system.

ROBERT

N.

COVINGTON

LIBEL PER SE AND SPECIAL DAMAGES
I. INTRODUCTION

Toward the end of the last century a few of the American courts
began to express the view that allegation and proof of special damages
is necessary in libel actions unless the defamatory meaning of the
words is apparent on their face.' Although none of these courts
appeared to realize it, this notion was entirely of their own invention.2 Under the orthodox theory, which went virtually unquestioned
108. Low v. Town of Madison, 135 Conn. 1, 60 A.2d 774 (1948).

109. Douglas, On Misconception of the Judicial Function and the Responsibility of the Bar, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 227, 228 (1959).
1. Walker v. Tribune Co., 29 Fed. 827 (N.D. Ill. 1887) (denying recovery
because the defamatory meaning of the word "crank" was not apparent on its
face); Tonini v. Cevasco, 114 Cal. 266, 46 Pac. 103 (1896) (statement that
plaintiff had been discharged for conduct "not irreprehensible" held defamatory on its face); Fry v. McCord Bros., 95 Tenn. 678, 33 S.W. 568 (1895)
(recovery denied because defamatory sense of the words depended upon
knowledge of circumstances extrinsic to statement, and no special damages
were alleged); Continental Nat'l Bank of Memphis v. Bowdre, 92 Tenn. 723,
23 S.W. 131 (1893) (dictum).
2. "A peculiarity of the situation is that the parents of this odd creaturethe courts-do not realize, despite the labor pains of its birth, that they
have brought forth a child." Carpenter, Libel Per Se in California and Some
Other States, 17 So. CAL.L. REV. 347 (1944). In what may have been the first
decision to assert the rule the court expressed the opinion that the law was
"well settled" in regard to it. Walker v. Tribune Co., 27 Fed. 827 (N.D. Ill.
1887). The same attitude is prevalent in. Iall the early opinions. See cases
cited supra note 1.

NOTES
in the century preceding these decisions,3 all written defamation is
actionable without proof of special damages, 4 whether it is designated
libel per se or libel per quod. Words which are defamatory on their
face are libelous per se; words which are prima facie innocent, but
defamatory in light of the circumstances of their publication, are
libelous per quod. In order to state a cause of action in libel per
quod, it is necessary to allege the extrinsic circumstances iMparting
a defamatory meaning to the language,5 but, under the orthodox
theory, special damages are never an essential allegation. In slander
the rule is otherwise. Unless the language is slanderous per se-that
is, unless it charges that the plaintiff has committed an indictable
offense,6 or imputes that he has a loathsome disease7 or that he is
unfit to perform his office, business or profession 8-proof of special
damages is necessary. This rule is not based upon logic; it is the
accidental product of a jurisdictional contest between the common
law and ecclesiastical courts of England, which the tort of libel was
fortunate enough to escape. 9 Commentators have generally denounced
3. Lord Mansfield disliked the rule, and would have liked to repudiate it,

but recognized that it was too well-established by precedent to be overturned. See Thorley v. Kerry, 4 Taunt. 355, 128 Eng. Rep. 367 (1812).
4. This rule was first announced in King v. Lake, Hadres 470, 145 Eng. Rep.

552, (1670). The court gave the following justification for permitting a wider

scope of actionability in libel than in slander: "although general words spoken
once without writing or publishing them would not be actionable; yet here,
more
contains
they being
Rep, at
553. malice than if they had
are published,
actionable."which
145 Eng.
been
spoken,writ
theyand
5. The pleading alleging the extrinsic circumstances is called the induceand the
the language
between
relationshipThe
the
showing that
The explanation
allegation
ment.
"innuendo."
the the
is called of
circumstances
language is directed against the plaintiff is the "colloquium." Whereas the
inducement and colloquum must be factual, rather than argumentative or
explanatory, the office of the innuendo is purely explanatory, it having no
evidentiary value of itself. See Age-Herald Publishing Co. v. Waterman, 188
So. 16 (1913).
Ala.
Carter272,
v. 66
Andrews,
33 Mass. Slander
1 (1834).pleading is subject to the same rules. See
6. E.g., Martin v. Stillwell, 13 Johns. 275 (N.Y. 1816) (keeping a bawdyhouse); Buckley v. O'Neil, 113 Mass. 193 (1873) (maintenance of a gambling
place).
7. E.g., Golderman v. Stearns, 73 Mass. 181 (1856) (venereal disease); Williams v. Holdridge, 22 Barb. 396 (N.Y. 1859) (leprosy). Some courts have held
that imputation of disease is not actionable if phrased in the past tense. See
TowNe
D, SIaxnzR AND LIL, 260, n.6 (3d ed. 1877).
8. E.g., Secor v. Harris, 18 Barb. 425 (N.Y. 1854) (statement that physician's
Fowles v. Bowen, 30 N.Y.
childrendirected
and a woman);
ignorance
killed
20 (1864) had
(charge
of two
dishonesty
against businessman).
9. Slander was originally considered a spiritual offense, and jurisdiction
over it was exclusively in the ecclesiastical courts. The per se categories
and the special damages requirement represent the extent to which this
jurisdiction
was taken
over
by thewas
common
law courts.
Jurisdiction
over
slander imputing
criminal
conduct
apparently
rationalized
on the basis.
that the common law courts had jurisdiction over punishment of criminal

conduct itself. Jurisdiction was taken where special damages were alleged.
on the basis that pecuniary loss is temporal, rather than spiritual. The claim
of the common law courts to the other two categories was apparently based
on the likelihood that imputation of disease or unfitness for one's occupation
would result in temporal loss. By the time the common law. was in a position
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the special damages requirement in slander on the basis that the
emphasis in defamation actions should be upon injury to reputation,
rather than upon pecuniary loss.10 Although the courts lacked the
initiative to dispose of this anachronistic requirement, they showed
no inclination, prior to the appearance of the above-mentioned decisions, to compound the error by introducing special damages into
the law of libel. In spite of its lack of historical foundation, however,
and in spite of the severe criticism it has received from writers,11
the notion that special damages are necessary in actions of libel per
quod has become increasingly popular with the courts, and probably
represents the prevailing view among those which have considered
2
the question.'
II. HISTORIcAL DEVELOPMENT
Whatever rational arguments are advanced in favor of it after the
fact, it is clear that this rule had its origin largely in judicial confusion. This confusion resulted from the misinterpretation of a theory
propounded by John Townshend in his treatise entitled Slander and
Libel,13 and contained in several nineteenth century libel opinions. 14
Townshend's thesis was that the gist of all defamation actions is
pecuniary injury, 5 and that, unless the court can presume the octo expand its jurisdiction to include all oral defamation, the pressure of
slander litigation had become so great that the courts were inclined to restrict,
rather than expand, this jurisdiction. See 8 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH

LAw 346-54 (4th ed. 1926); PROSSER, TORTS § 92 (2d ed. 1955); PLucxNETT, A
CONcIsE HISTORY OF THE COmmON LAW 427-45 (2d ed. 1936); Veeder, History
and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 COLUM. L. Rnv. 546 (1903).
10. 8 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 365-66 (4th ed. 1926); POLLOCx,
TORTS 324 (13th ed. 1929); 1 STREET, FoUNDATIoNs or LEGAL LIABILITY 273
(1906); Veeder, History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 4 COLUm. L.
REv. 33 (1904).
11. "This article is written for the benefit of lawyers and courts of the States

that have produced the new offspring, so they may see that it is a new
creature, and that it is ugly and illegitimate and ought promptly to be
strangled." Carpenter, Libel Per Se in California and Some Other States,
17 So. CAL. L. REv. 347 (1944). The line of New York cases accepting the rule
is severely criticized in SEELMAN, LAW OF LIBEL AND SLANDER § 42 (1941). See
also McComvrcx, DAMAGES 417-18 (1935); PROSSER, TORTS 588 (2d ed. 1955).
12. PROSSER, TORTS 588 (2d ed. 1955). California has enacted the rule into
statute. CAL. Ci. CODE § 45 a (1945).
13. TOWNSHEND, SLANDER AND LIBEL (3d ed. 1877).
14. See cases cited in note 21 infra.
15. '"We do not intend to deny that the law does in fact, and to a great
extent, protect reputation; but we intend to be understood as insisting that,
where the law does protect reputation, it does so indirectly, by means of a
fiction-an assumption of pecuniary loss. In theory, the action for slander
or libel is always for pecuniary injury, and not for injury to the reputation."
ToWNsHEND, SLANDER AND LIBEL (3d ed. 1877). This much of Townshend's
thesis coincides with Holdsworth's analysis of the historical basis of libel.
See 8 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 365 (4th ed. 1926). But see
Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 4 COLUM. L. REv.
33, 34 (1904), stating that Townshend's analysis is "historically untrue." The
better modern scholarship views defamation as injury to reputation, which
is deemed a "relational," rather than a pecuniary interest. See PRossEm,
TORTS § 92 (2d ed. 1955); Green, Relational Interest, 31 ILL. L. REv. 35 (1936).

NOTES
currence of such injury from the severity of the language, pecuniary
loss in the form of special damages must be pleaded by the complaining party. Where the presumption arises, the language is said
to be actionable per se. Oral language is actionable per se when it
charges criminal conduct, disability in business, contraction of disease, or want of chastity; written language is actionable per se when
it tends "'to bring a party into public hatred or disgrace', or 'to
degrade him in society' or expose him to hatred contempt or ridicule
... ,116 Since this latter definition is sufficiently broad to include all
written defamation, the result of its application is to make all of what
is conventionally called libel libelous per se. Taken in light of this
definition, Townshend's statement that special damages are necessary unless the language is libelous per se means only that special
damages are necessary in cases where the words are non-defamatory.
This has always been so, although actions to recover special damages
resulting from non-defamatory language are generally termed disparagement or injurious falsehood actions,17 rather than libel actions.
It seems clear, therefore, that Townshend's analysis contemplated no
substantive change in the law of defamation.' 8 It was merely an attempt to develop a uniform terminology and rationale for libel and
slander, and to incorporate all actions based upon words into one
theory, the gist of which is pecuniary injury.19
Instead of lessening judicial confusion, however, this use of
terminology ultimately increased it.2 0 So long as courts which used
the term libel per se in connection with a presumption of pecuniary
injury defined it as Townshend defined it, the substance of the hold16. TOWNSHEND, SLANDER AND LIBEL 263 (3d ed. 1877).
17. PROSSER, TORTS § 108 (2d ed. 1955).
18. "1 disclaim innovation ....
"
TOwNsHEND, SLANDER AND LIBEL (3d ed.
1877) (preface page).
19. Slander and libel are to include all "wrongs occasioned by language or
effigy." ToWNSHEND, SLANDER AND LIBEL § 22 (3d ed. 1877) including, apparently, injurious language directed against plaintiff's property. Id. at §§ 204-06.
20. Townshend did not invent the terminology, although the cases show he
was a major influence in its dissemination. The term libel per se as he used
it had some currency before the appearance of his treatise. The relative
dearth of precedent for its use is illustrated, however, by the type of authority
cited in the decisions which made use of it in the 1880's and 1890's. (These
decisions are cited in note 21 infra.) Most of the citations are to slander
cases which confine their discussion to slander per se, making no mention of
libel per se. One frequently cited source of authority is the slander case of
Terwilliger v. Wands, 17 N.Y. 54, 72 Am. Dec. 420 (1858). The citations
apparently refer to the annotation following the case in the American Decisions Reporter, rather than to the case itself. This annotation states: "The
following cases show that some special injury must have resulted from the
libel or slander, and that special damages must be alleged . . . and . . .
proved in order to sustain a recovery where the language is not actionable
per se." This would offer support for Mr. Townshend and the courts adopting
his thesis, except for the fact that all of the cases which the annotator cites as
authority for his proposition are slander cases.
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ings remained unchanged. 21 The trouble arose when the courts
began to confuse their definitions. Whereas Townshend had used
"libel per se" correlatively with "slander per se" to refer to the
injuriousness of the probable effect of the language, its more usual
meaning is that the defamatory sense of the language is apparent on
its face without reference to extrinsic circumstances. By reading
this latter definition into Townshend's proposition that special damages are necessary unless the words are libelous per se, some courts
came to the illogical conclusion, which prevails in this country today,
that special damages are necessary unless the words can be shown
22
to be defamatory without proof of extrinsic circumstances.
The cases adopting this rule agree that in order to be libelous per se
the language must be defamatory on its face, 23 but there is a conflict
21. See Achorn v. Piper, 66 Iowa 694, 24 N.W. 513 (1885) (not libelous per
se, because would not provoke plaintiffs to wrath, or expose them to public
hatred or ridicule.); Urban v. Helmick, 15 Wash. 155, 45 Pac. 747 (1896)
(hostile comment on plaintiff's manner of doing business not libelous per se);
Hanaw v. Jackson Patriot Co., 98 Mich. 506, 57 N.W. 734 (1894) (term "libelous per se" used interchangeably with "libelous"); Hirschfield v. Fort Worth
Nat'l Bank, 83 Tex. 452, 18 S.W. 743 (1892) (statement that plaintiff's note
refused not libelous per se because it did not imply plaintiff's dishonesty);
Morey v. Morning Journal Ass'n, 123 N.Y. 207, 25 N.E. 161 (1890) (libel per se
is language tending to disgrace plaintiff and bring him into contempt and
ridicule); Donaghue v. Caffey, 53 Conn. 43, 2 Atl. 397 (1885) (statement concerning lawful business practice not libelous per se); Newbold v. Bradstreet
Co., 57 Md. 38 (1881) (statement that plaintiff had given a chattel mortgage
not libelous per se because reasonable implication not dishonesty or insolvency). It is clear that these courts are merely using new terminology to
express the idea that the language is not defamatory; substituting the term
"libel per se" for "libel," and "failure to state special damages" for "failure to
state a cause of action."
22. This confusion is illustrated graphically in the case of Fry v. McCord
Bros., 95 Tenn. 678, 33 S.W. 568 (1895). The court quotes Townshend as follows: "language which, however, does not, as a necessary consequence,
occasion damage to the party published is not per se libelous, and, in such
cases, a right of action exists only when, as a necessary and proximate consequence of the publication, special damage ensues the party published." The
Tennessee Court interprets this statement thus: "[W]e think a statement in
substance and effect the same . . .is, that words which, upon their face and

without the aid of extrinsic proof are injurious, are libelous per se; but if the
injurious character of the words appear ...

only in consequence of extrinsic

circumstances, they are not libelous per se." Fry v. McCord Bros., 95 Tenn.
678, 684-85, 33 S.W. 568, 570 (1895). See also Rowan v. Gazette Printing Co.,
74 Mont. 326, 239 Pac. 1035 (1925) (attempt to correlate orthodox meaning of
libel per se with slander per se); McNamara v. Goldan, 194 N.Y. 315, 87 N.E.
440 (1909) (libel per se is libel which is actionable without necessity of alleging extrinsic facts); Nichols v. Daily Reporter Co., 30 Utah 74, 83 Pac.
573 (1905) (citing Fry v. McCord Bros., supra); National Bank of Memphis
v. Bowdre, 92 Tenn. 736, 23 S.W. 131 (1893) (citing Townshend).
23. This statement is subject to some qualification, in that one or two jurisdictions define libel per se, for purposes of determining the necessity for
special damages, in terms of the slander per se categories. See Carwile v.
Richmond Newspapers, 196 Va. 1, 82 S.E.2d 588 (1954); Proto v. Bridgeport
Herald Corp., 136 Conn. 557, 72 A.2d 820 (1950) (semble). Thus, these courts
have done what Lord Mansfield felt he could not do in 1812 because precedent
was too firmly established. See note 3, supra. This view is more in line with
Townshend's idea of libel per se, although much more restricted, than is the
majority definition. In favor of it, it may be said that it confers uniformity

NOTES
as to the applicable rule of construction for determiningwhen words

are defamatory on their face. The prevailing common law practice
seems to have been to construe the words in their "plain and
natural" import, and to hold them libelous per se if, when so construed, they appeared capable of conveying a defamatory meaning.24
This practice is still followed in a number of jurisdictions.25 Other
jurisdictions require that the words be unambiguously defamatorythat is, they construe language innocently when it is reasonably
susceptible of such construction.26 This latter practice bears a close
resemblance to the rule of construction which the seventeenth
century English courts imposed upon slander. The outlawing of
dueling in that century had diverted many disputes involving private
insults from the field of battle into the courts of law, thus precipitating a flood of slander litigation. In self defense the courts
devised the much-maligned 27 doctrine of mitior sensu, which required that words be given an innocent construction whenever humanly possible. 28 The application of this doctrine resulted in some
of the most ingenious, ludicrous, and unjust opinions ever produced. 29
Although the modern libel cases have been less extreme, the requirement that language be unambiguously defamatory has constricted
the libel per se concept significantly. Where this construction is
adopted the rule requiring special damages where the language is not
libelous per se is especially harsh.
III. PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE

In jurisdictions where the language is construed according to its
on the law of defamation, although most authorities would contend that

making libel similar to slander is moving in the wrong direction to attain uniformity. See note 10, supra.
24. See the learned and thorough treatment of the matter in Age-Herald
Publishing Co. v. Waterman, 188 Ala. 272, 66 So. 16 (1913).
25. E.g., Myers v. Mobile Press-Register, Inc., 266 Ala. 508, 97 So. 2d 819
(1957); Gough v. Tribune-Journal Co., 73 Idaho 173, 249 P.2d 192 (1952);
Sweeny & Co. v. Brown, 60 S.W.2d 381 (Ky. 1933); Rachels v. Deener, 182
Ark. 931, 33 S.W.2d 39 (1930); Jerald v. Houston, 124 Kan. 657, 261 Pac. 851
(1927); Wiley v. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co., 106 Okla. 52, 233 Pac. 224,
(1924).
26. E.g., Brewer v. Hearst Publishing Co., 185 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1950);
Smith v. Los Angeles Bookbinders Union No. 63, 133 Cal. App. 486, 284 P.2d
194 (1955); Dalton v. Woodward, 134 Neb. 915, 280 N.W. 215 (1938); Ruble v.
Kirkwood, 125 Ore. 316, 266 Pac. 252 (1928).
27. E.g., 8 HoLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 358 (4th ed. 1926) ("evil
results"); PROSSER, TORTS 580 (2d ed. 1955) ("artificial and absurd").
28. See 8 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 353-56 (4th ed. 1926).
29. The art of construing in mitior sensu probably reached its zenith in the
famous case of Holt v. Astgrigg, 79 Eng. Rep. 161 (1608). In that case the
allegedly slanderous language was: "Sir Thomas Holt struck his cook on the
head with a cleaver, and cleaved his head; the one part lay on the one shoulder, and another part on the other." The court held that this was not slanderous per se because "it is not averred that the cook was killed ....
[N]otwithstanding such wounding, the party may yet be living; and it is then but
trespass." The court was of the opinion that slander "ought to be direct."
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plain and natural meaning in determining whether it is libelous per se,
the effect of the special damages requirement upon the rights of
litigants has been relatively slight. The requirement can have effect
only in cases where the language is libelous per quod,30 and in
these jurisdictions, libel per quod occurs only where there are extrinsic circumstances which impart a defamatory meaning to words
whose natural meaning is innocent. Since such instances comprise a
small fraction of the cases, 31 most of the reiteration of the special
damages requirement is dicta. Where cases calling for its application have arisen, the courts have tended to avoid defeating just
claims by one of the following means: (1) ad hoc expansion of the
definition of libel per se to include the language in litigation;3 2 (2)
generous interpretation of the concept of special damages to include
the type of injury alleged in the complaint; 33 (3) sub silentio
renunciation of the special damages rule;34 (4) express renunciation
35
of the special damages rule.
The typical situation in which a court purports to invoke the rule
The
is illustrated by the case of Gough v. Tribune-Journal Co.
public
official,
a
that
plaintiff,
stating
alleged libel was a news story
had walked out of a budget hearing. Plaintiff alleged that this was
defamatory, in that it charged him with neglect of duty. This was the
entire substance of his complaint. The court held that, because "the
ordinary reader could not read into the story .. . a dereliction of
duty"3 7 the words were not libelous per se, and, since no special
damages were alleged, no cause of action was stated. It will be
noted that no extrinsic circumstances are alleged which would tend
to alter the sense of the words. If, therefore, the words are not
libelous in themselves, they are not libelous at all; the plaintiff has
not attempted to state a case of libel per quod. In view of this, the
court's statement of its holding says too much. The basic defect in
the above complaint is not that it fails to allege special damages, but
that it fails to allege a libel.38
30. If the language is libelous per se, there is recovery whether or not
special damages are alleged. If it is not libelous at all, no court would permit
recovery regardless of whether the special damages rule was adopted.
31. See cases cited, infra notes 38 and 42.
32. Balabanoff v. Hearst Consolidated Pub., Inc., 294 N.Y. 351, 62 N.E.2d
599 (1945) (see text, infra); Sydney v. MacFadden Newspaper Pub. Corp.,
242 N.Y. 208, 151 N.E. 209 (1926) (see text infra).
33. Karrigan v.Valentine, 184 Kan. 783, 339 P.2d 52 (1959) (see text infra);
Koerner v.Lawler, 180 Kan. 318, 304 P.2d 926 (1956).
34. Braun v.Armour & Co., 254 N.Y. 514, 173 N.E. 845 (1930) (see text
infra); Smith v. Smith, 236 N.Y. 581, 142 N.E. 292 (1923) (see text infra).
35. Herrmann v.Newark Morning Ledger Co., 48 N.J. Super. 420, 138 A.2d
61 (1958).
36. 73 Idaho 173, 249 P.2d 192 (1952).
37. 249 P.2d at 195.
38. See also Schy v. Hearst Pub. Co., 205 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1953);
Waller v. Tribune Co., 29 Fed. 827 (N.D. Ill. 1887); Meyers v. Mobile Press-
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Although the courts consistently make grandiose statements about

disregarding all "inducement, colloquium, and innuendo"3 9 in determining whether language is libelous per se, they are seldom called

upon to disregard anything other than the plaintiffs' improbable
interpretation of the words. In Nordlund v. Consolidated Electric
Co-operative40 the alleged libel was an article pointing out the
dangers and difficulties of using gas in the home. Plaintiff, a distributor of gas, contended that the meaning of this was that plaintiff
(1) fraudulently deceived customers by selling them gas without
revealing its dangers to them, and (2) violated a statute requiring
gas to be odorized as a protection against such dangers. The court
disregarded these assertions, held that the words were not libelous
per se, and denied recovery because of the failure to plead special
damages. The true basis for the holding would seem to be that the
words are not libelous at all, since the courts are uniform in stating
that a party may not make words libelous by arbitrarily assigning
to them a meaning which they will not reasonably bear 41 In cases
such as this, the special damages requirement would seem to have
no legitimate legal effect upon the rights of litigants;2 although,
as a practical matter, it may cause a court to be less hesitant about
denying relief in a close case of language construction.
In a few cases the special damages issue has been squarely raised,
and the court has applied the rule literally, refusing recovery because
the libel is per quod and special damages are not alleged. In Brodek
v. Jones43 the plaintiff was a lawyer who had been employed to conduct negotiations for the defendant. The alleged libel was contained
in a telegram which read, "Brodek [plaintiff] should be paid by the
Register, Inc., 266 Ala. 508, 97 So. 2d 819 (1957); Nordlund v. Consolidated
Elec. Co-op., 289 S.W.2d 93 (Mo. 1956); Dressler v. Mayer, 22 N.J. Super.
129, 91 A.2d 650 (1952); Cooper v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 159 Fla. 296,
31 So. 2d 382 (1947); Nat'l Variety Artists, Inc. v. Mosconi, 9 N.Y.S.2d 498, 169
Misc. 982 (1939); Dalton v. Woodward, 134 Neb. 915, 280 N.W. 215 (1938);
Rachels v. Deener, 182 Ark. 931, 33 S.W.2d 39 (1930); Talbot v. Mark, 41
Nev. 245, 169 Pac. 25 (1917); O'Connel v. Press Publishing Co., 214 N.Y. 352,
108 N.E.556 (1915).

39. See note 4 supra,for definitions of these terms.
40. 289 S.W.2d 93 (Mo. 1956).
41. See cases cited in PROssER,

TORTS § 92, n.29 (2d ed. 1955).
42. See also Schy v. Hearst Pub. Co., 205 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1953) (statement that "it was the lowest blow ever struck at any representative of workers . . .- it really hurts," cannot be construed to mean a physical blow);

Meyers v. Mobile Press-Register, Inc., 266 Ala. 508, 97 So. 2d 819 (1957)

(charges of "iron curtain" tactics and "rapacious rule," uttered in a political
context did not mean that plaintiff was opposed to the republican form of
government); Talbot v. Mark, 41 Nev. 245, 169 Pac. 25 (1917) (statement
that corporation was over-loaded did not mean that plaintiff, an employee,
was dishonest); Urban v. Helmick, 15 Wash. 155, 45 Pac. 747 (1896) (charge
that plaintiff was a hog in his business policies did not mean that he was
actuated by the "low dirty groveling grasping gluttonous .. .instincts . . .of
hogs or swine").
43. 212 App. Div. 247, 208 N.Y.S. 699 (1925).
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The inducement alleged

was that the person receiving the telegram had been paid by the
person with whom defendant was negotiating, and that, therefore,
the meaning of the telegram was that plaintiff had been disloyal to
defendant, his client, by "effectively serving" the party with whom
defendant was negotiating, rather than defendant himself. The court,
however, refused to consider the extrinsic relationship of the parties,
and held that, since the plain and natural meaning of the words
themselves was non-defamatory, there could be no recovery in the
absence of special damages. Other cases have reached similar results
under roughly similar circumstances, 45 but they are few in number,
and no very recent ones have been discovered. 46
The New York Court of Appeals, which decided the Brodek case, has
been inconsistent in its application of the rule. In the famous case of
Sydney v. MacFadden Newspaper Publishing Corp.47 the defendant
had informed the public that plaintiff was "Fatty Arbuckle's latest
lady love." The defamatory impact of this statement resulted from
the unpublished fact that plaintiff was a married woman. The court
considered this fact in its determination of the actionability of the
language, even though no special damages were alleged, and held
that a cause of action was stated.48 Although this decision has the
appearance of a complete repudiation of the special damages rule,
49
subsequent New York decisions have continued to assert it.
The Sydney opinion may be explainable as an adoption of the
same sort of modification of the rule as is suggested in the later case
of Balabanoff v. Hearst Consolidated Publishing Corp.50 In that case
the plaintiff had been accused by the defendant of having been a
member of the Cheka. Although the allegedly libelous statement
contained no such description, plaintiff was permitted to introduce
evidence showing that the Cheka was a feared and hated organization.
The court said that "the allegations of the complaint describing the
organization of the 'Cheka' are essential to an understanding of the
language ...

and do not, in our opinion, constitute extrinsic facts of

such a character as to necessitate allegations of special damages." 5' 1
44. 208 N.Y.S. at 701.

45. See Ellsworth v. Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, Inc., 66 N.D. 578,
268 N.W. 400 (1936); Sweeney & Co. v. Brown, 60 S.W.2d 381 (Ky. 1933);
Fry v. McCord Bros., 95 Tenn. 678, 33 S.W. 568 (1895).

46. Note that the most recent case cited in the preceding footnote was

decided twenty-four years ago.

47. 242 N.Y. 208, 151 N.E. 209 (1926).
48. Pound, J. registered a vigorous dissent, contending that the special dam-

ages rule should have been applied.
49. In National Variety Artists, Inc. v. Mosconi, 9 N.Y.S.2d 498, 169 Misc.
982 (1939), the court explicitly denied that the special damages rule has
been repudiated in New York.
50. 294 N.Y. 351, 62 N.E.2d 599 (1945).
51. 62 N.E.2d at 600.
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At another point in the opinion it is said that the language is actionable because it "fairly raises" the question of whether plaintiff is
being defamed. It may be that, in both the Sydney and Balabanoff
decisions, the Court of Appeals intended to take the following compromise position: where an allegedly libelous statement lacks information essential to an understanding of the full import of what is
said, and the ordinary reader would realize this lack, and would be
uncertain as to whether or not knowledge of this information would
render the statement defamatory, the plaintiff may incorporate the
information in his complaint to show that the statement was defamatory, even though no special damages are alleged. Thus, special
damages would be required only where words are, on their face, both
innocent and apparently self-explanatory. At the very least, this position represents a substantial modification of the special damages rule;
even more significantly, it may indicate a feeling that the rule is
unjust, and a disposition not to apply it should the question ever
squarely be raised.
The New York position is rendered even more uncertain by the
decision in Smith v. Smith52 and Braun v. Armour.5 Both of these
are clear cases of libel per quod, and yet recovery is permitted with
no mention being made of special damages. In the Smith case the
defendant had filled out an application for a marriage license, answering the question as to whether he was a divorced person, "no".
Plaintiff, the prospective bride, alleged by way of inducement that she
and defendant had in fact formerly been married and divorced, and
that the meaning of defendant's answer on the application blank was
that plaintiff and defendant had been living together in an unmarried
condition. In the Braun case the libelous words were contained in an
advertisement, which stated that plaintiff was one of a group of progressive dealers, who sold "Armour Star bacon in the new windowtop carton." Plaintiff's inducement was that he was a kosher meat
dealer, and that the statement that he sold bacon was therefore, extremely injurious to his reputation. Both of these are memorandum
opinions, and it is conceivable that special damages were too clearly
alleged to merit mention by the court. If, however, these two holdings
are what they appear to be, they are explainable only as sub silentio
repudiations of the special damages requirement.
Kansas has avoided the injustice of the rule through a generous
interpretation of what constitutes special damages. In Karrigan v.
ValentineM the defendant published an announcement stating that
plaintiff's wife had recently given birth to the couple's third child.
52. 236 N.Y. 581, 142 N.E. 292 (1923).
53. 254 N.Y. 514, 173 N.E. 845 (1930).

54. 184 Kan. 783, 339 P.2d 52 (1959).
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The complaint alleged that plaintiff was in fact a bachelor and that
the woman described as his wife was a lady of notorious ill-repute,
who had given birth to several children out of wedlock. The damages
alleged were a conglomeration of items ranging from mental anguish
and a request for punitive damages to sixty cents for a phone call to
an attorney. Forced to concede that the words were not libelous per
se, the court avoided a harsh result by finding, "after long and careful
study," that there was a sufficient allegation of special damages to
55
satisfy the requirement for libel per quod.
Instead of resorting to the indirections practiced by the New York
and Kansas Courts, New Jersey took the sensible approach of repudiating the special damages rule when it appeared that its application would be unjust.56 In analyzing the prior New Jersey decisions,
the court discovered that the rule had never been a decisive factor in
any case in which it was asserted. This same analysis is applicable to
most of the decisions on the matter in other jurisdictions. The dogma
that extrinsic circumstances will not be regarded in the absence of
special damages is often repeated, but seldom applicable, and when
it becomes applicable, most courts, like the New Jersey court, have
been unwilling to let it work its injustice. Since the courts apparently
do. not like to apply the rule, and since its application is without
logical justification, the course adopted by New Jersey would seem to
be the most rational one. At any rate, it seems preferable to paying
lip service to the doctrine, while consistently avoiding its application
through subterfuge and equivocation.
The special damages rule has had its greatest effect in those
jurisdictions which refuse to hold language libelous per se unless it
is unambiguously defamatory. The courts have been less hesitant
about applying this rule than they have about disregarding relevant
extrinsic circumstances. In Ruble v. Kirkland57 defendant published
a statement that plaintiff had been made a defendant in both civil and
criminal actions, and that the complaining party in these actions was
alleging fraud and gross misrepresentation. The court found that this
was susceptible of an innocent construction because: (1) there was no
showing that the crime charged was one of moral turpitude (although
the statement clearly specified fraud and gross misrepresentation);
(2) the statement mentioned that the action was brought by an in55. In Koerner v. Lawler, 180 Kan 318, 304 P.2d 926 (1956), the special
damages consisted in plaintiff's allegation that the libel was published for
the purpose of injuring his reputation and his business. From this, the court
deduced that plaintiff was alleging the actual occurrence of injury to his business, and permitted recovery, although no specific pecuniary loss was alleged.
56. "We... hold that it is not necessary to plead or prove special pecuniary
damages ... by mere reason of the fact that reference to extrinsic facts will
be necessary to expose the defamatory impact . . . ." Herrmann v. Newark
Morning Ledger Co., 48 N.J. Super. 420, 138 A.2d 61 (1958).
57. 125 Ore. 316, 266 Pac. 252 (1928).
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dividual, making it doubtful whether it was a criminal proceeding
at all (although the statement specified that both civil and criminal
actions had been brought); and (3) there was no implication of
guilt (although being made a defendant in such an action would,
in itself, seem sufficiently injurious to reputation).
Perhaps the outstanding modern example of the innocent construction of obviously damaging language is that contained in the Illinois
case of Parmalee v. Hearst.- The defendant newspaper published
the information that plaintiff was one of the "wild people" associated
with Henry Wallace, other persons associated with Wallace being
described as "malignant communists." The writer further asserted
that plaintiff had "wormed his way into government," and that he
was the author of "depraved books" which were so "disgusting" that
he was "pinched." The court found that the term "wild people" was
used as a genus, of which "strange company" and "malignant communists" were each species, and that, while plaintiff was described
as belonging to the same genus as the "malignant communists," the
description was not defamatory, because it differentiated him from
that group by placing him in the "strange company" species. The
other statements are analyzed less elaborately, the court apparently
dismissing them as expressions of opinion.
These opinions, and others like them,59 convey the impression that
the court has decided against plaintiff from the outset, and is willing
to go through whatever mental contortions are necessary in order to
give its prejudice legal justification. In considering the basis for
this attitude, the following factors seem relevant: (1) libel actions
60
tend to be an outlet for the assertion of petty or unfounded claims; (2) the pressure of libel litigation has undoubtedly increased overthe last century, due to the multiplication of mass circulation newspapers, with their gossip columns and often controversial news.
stories; 61 (3) some courts seem to feel that a liberal attitude toward62
Sincelibel is an undesirable inhibition to freedom of expression.
58. 341 Ill. App. 339, 93 N.E.2d 512 (1950).

59. Smith v. Los Angeles Bookbinders Union No. 63, 133 Cal. App. 486, 284P.2d 194 (1955) (no recovery, although reasonable implication of statement
was that plaintiff exploited his workers and that his equipment, workmanship.
and service were inferior to that of other bookbinders); Epton v. Vail, 2 Ill.
App. 2d 287, 119 N.E.2d 410 (1954) (statement that plaintiff was "lwellfinanced" in his political campaign by funds he obtained purportedly for another purpose); Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Kelly, 163 Ala. 348, 50 So..
1008 (1909) (statement that plaintiff had run people out of their homes givern
innocent construction on basis that it might have been done as a joke); Geisler
v. Brown, 6 Neb. 254 (1877) (statement that plaintiff was inhuman and beat
her step-child over the head with a club not libelous per se because it was
not alleged that the beating was "wilful").
60. See, e.g., cases cited in note 38, supra.

61. Note the number of cases cited in this note involving newspaper de-

fendants, particularly among the more recent citations.
62. "The requirements for actionable libel are strict in the interests of pro-
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the preliminary question of whether the language is capable of conveying a defamatory meaning is with the judge, 63 the practice of
construing it innocently if possible is an effective means of keeping
all but the most clear-cut claims from jury consideration. Thus, it
seems plausible that pressure of petty litigation, which caused the
application of mitior sensu to slander in an age when oral insult
constituted the bulk of defamation cases64 has also been the cause of its
application to libel in an age when most of the litigation arises out of
written communication. To courts which have adopted mitior sensu,
the special damages rule has a substantial significance, and it seems
doubtful whether many of them will repudiate it, so long as their
attitude toward libel remains unchanged.
IV. CONCLUSIONS

The rule that special damages are necessary unless the defamatory
sense of the language can be determined without reference to extrinsic circumstances cannot be justified on any logical basis. In the
first place, its basic assumption that the gist of libel is pecuniary
injury is repudiated by the better modern opinion.6 5 In the second
place, even though the assumption is accepted, it does not justify the
rule. The rule is based upon the notion, applicable to other types of
torts, 66 that pecuniary loss must be pleaded unless it follows necessarily from the injury. 67 To apply this notion to libel per quod is to beg
the question as to what constitutes the injury in libel. It necessitates the assumption that the injury is determined only with
reference to the words themselves, when, traditionally, and it would
seem, logically, it has been determined with reference to the context
in which the language was published. A third objection to the
logic of the rule is that, instead of creating unity in the law of defamation, as presumably would have occurred had Townshend's analysis
been strictly followed, this corruption of his theory compounds the
disunity of defamation by placing the special damages requirement
in libel and that in slander on completely unrelated bases.
The rule is unjust, in that it creates inequality among the standing
of litigants. The injury may be as great where the defamation is
tecting freedom of expression." Parmelee v. Hearst, 341 Ill. App. 339, 93
N.E.2d 512, 515 (1950).
63. Age-Herald Publishing Co. v. Waterman, 188 Ala. 272, 66 So. 16 (1913);
PRossER, TORTS § 92 and cases cited in n.15 (2d ed. 1955).
64. See notes 28 and 29 supra, and accompanying text.
65. See PROSSER, TORTS § 92 (2d ed. 1955); Green, Relational Interests, 31
ILL. L. REV. 35 (1936).
66. McCoRMvcK, DAMAGES 32 (1935).

67. Almost all the cases continue to state this theory as the basis for the
rule, although it would seem inapplicable in light of the current definition of

libel per se.
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latent as where it is patent.68 The only possible arguments of making
a distinction along this line are that in the former case the area of
injurious impact is restricted to persons with knowledge of the extrinsic circumstances, and the injury is only as durable as the memories of
those with such knowledge. 69 These arguments are undiscriminating.
While in some cases the area of injurious impact will be smaller
where the libel is latent, in many cases the area of significant impact
may be identical. In such a case it is small consolation for a plaintiff
shunned by his friends to learn that he has not been defamed in the
eyes of strangers. It would seem more rational to adjust for varying
injury in the assessment of damages, according to the circumstances
of the individual case.
The continued repetition of the rule is unrealistic, since the courts
apparently have no interest in applying it. Its assertion usually
succeeds only in concealing the true basis of decision which is that the
language is not defamatory,70 or in forcing the court to strain unnaturally to reach a just result.71 The courts should either apply the rule
or discard it-preferably, the latter.
The rule has had some force where the language is construed in
mitior sensu, and in these jurisdictions, it seems unlikely that it will
be discarded. The mitior sensu construction restricts the right of
recovery, but it at least has the saving grace of consistency. It is
indiscriminately harsh upon all plaintiffs. While courts applying this
construction tend to demand an unreasonably clear showing of a
likelihood of injury, they have shown no more inclination to exclude
relevant evidence of extrinsic circumstances than have the other
courts. These courts would do much to clarify the issues if they
adopted, in form as well as in practice, a rule that the language is to
be given an innocent construction if it is reasonably susceptible of it
in light of the circumstances surrounding its publication. Such a
rule would be in line with the results of the opinions. Furthermore,
it would be justified on the presumption-of-pecuniary-loss theory,
since it would make the actionability of the language dependent
upon its apparent capacity to injure. If the courts are determined
to discourage libel litigation, it would seem preferable that they do
so on this basis alone, rather than injecting the irrelevant distinction
between patent and latent defamation.
Despite the eminent authority in support of the proposition that
68. E.g., Karrigan v. Valentine, 184 Kan. 783, 339 P.2d 52 (1959); (see text
supra); Smith v. Smith, 236 N.Y. 581, 142 N.E.2d 292 (1923) (see text supra).
69. There is a slight suggestion of such an argument in Tonini v. Cevasco,
114 Cal. 266, 46 Pac. 103 (1896). See also SMITH & PROSSER, CASES ON TORTS
1063 (2d ed. 1957).

70. See notes 38 and 42 supra,and accompanying text.
71. See notes 47-55 supra, and accompanying text.

